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ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: TiHE NEED FOR CONSISTENT
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPLICATION OF THE
BAN ON EXECUTING THE INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED*
ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in deciding Atkins v. Virginia. In Atkins, the
Court prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled individuals. In
doing so, however, the Court provided the states with very little guidance
and left the implementation of the ban to the discretion of the states.
Providing the states such discretion has resulted in Atkins standards with
inconsistencies in the following areas: (1) the definitional framework,
(2) the definitional components, (3) the identity of the fact finder and the
timing of the determination, and (4) the allocation of and standard for the
burden of proof.
To highlight the inconsistencies in the Atkins standards among vari-
ous states, this Comment will survey the Atkins standards in three of the
Tenth Circuit states: Oklahoma, Colorado, and Kansas. This Comment
will then examine how such inconsistency violates the Eighth Amend-
ment and the doctrine of incorporation. To remedy these violations, it is
vital that the states implement a consistent Atkins standard to implement
the Supreme Court's ban on executing the intellectually disabled. Conse-
quently, this Comment will sum up by recommending the standard that
the states should implement. This recommendation provides a consistent
standard and incorporates the mandates provided by the Supreme Court
in Atkins along with mandates of the mental health sciences. Implement-
ing this standard will allow the states to remedy the aforementioned con-
stitutional violations and uphold the law laid down in Atkins v. Virginia.
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INTRODUCTION
In Atkins v. Virginia,' a landmark Eighth Amendment case, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that executing intellectually disa-
bled defendants falls within the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.2 In its opinion, however, the Court provided very little guid-
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Id at 321. The Court explains that the Eighth Amendment prohibits categories of "exces-
sive" sanctions and that the concept of excessiveness is to be determined by reference to society's
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ance on how to define and enforce this new ban and instead left the task
up to the states. As a result, the Atkins standard has been applied incon-
sistently among the states allowing the death penalty.4 These inconsist-
encies, discussed in Part H and III of this Comment, can be found in sev-
eral areas, including the definitional framework for intellectual disability,
the assessment of the components of the definition, the appropriate fact
finder and timing for the intellectual disability determination made dur-
ing an Atkins hearing, and the standard and allocation of the burden of
proof.
These inconsistencies, in turn, have lent themselves to two principal
constitutional issues discussed in Part IV of this Comment. First, the
inconsistent and arbitrary application of the Atkins standard among the
states violates the Eighth Amendment due to the resultant unequal treat-
ment of intellectually disabled defendants based solely on their state of
residence. Second, for similar reasons, the inconsistent application of the
standard also violates the doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
These constitutional violations call for a remedy, and that remedy
can be found in consistent use of the Atkins standard and procedures that
this Comment recommends in Part V. The recommended standard for
intellectual disability includes utilization of the definitional framework
advocated by the American Association on Intellectual Disabilities
(AAIDD) (formerly the American Association on Intellectual Disability)
and its concomitant definitions of each component thereof. To ensure
consistent application across the states, it is important to have a con-
sistent procedure for implementing the Atkins ban. Accordingly, this
Comment recommends that prior to trial, a judge make the intellectual
disability determination. It is further recommended that defendants have
the burden of proving that they are intellectually disabled by a prepon-
derance of the evidence based on the findings of a qualified expert. Con-
sistent utilization of this standard will remedy the constitutional viola-
tions posed by the various Atkins standards and will help to fairly and
consistently implement the ban mandated by the Atkins Court.
I. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: THE CREATION OF THE ATKINS STANDARD
In Atkins, defendant Daryl Atkins was tried and convicted of capital
murder.6 During the sentencing phase of trial, a forensic psychologist for
the defense testified that based on interviews with Atkins's associates,
"evolving standards of decency." Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Id. at 317.
4. Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the Intel-
lectually Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L REV. 685, 686 (2009).
5. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders
and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77 passim (2003).
6. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
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his school, medical, and court records, and an intellectual quotient (IQ)
test, Atkins was "mildly"7 intellectually disabled. The State then present-
ed evidence from the trial record and from victim impact statements to
prove Atkins's future dangerousness and the "vileness of the offense."
After deliberations, the jury chose to impose the death penalty on At-
kins.9 Due to errors in the verdict form, however, the Supreme Court of
Virginia ordered a second sentencing hearing.' 0 At that hearing, the State
put on its own rebuttal expert (apart from the original defense expert),
who testified that Atkins was of "average intelligence, at least."" Again,
the jury chose to impose the death penalty. 12 Relying on the Supreme
Court precedent of Penry v. Lynaugh,13 the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the sentence.14 Atkins appealed to the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States and due to "the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape"
since the Penry decision, the Court granted certiorari.'
In its decision on the merits, the Court held that executing intellec-
tually disabled offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.16 At the outset,
it noted that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence depends on society's
"evolving standards of decency."' 7 With that in mind, the Court began by
surveying the various state legislative declarations concerning execution
of intellectually disabled offenders.'8 Because over thirty-four states had
enacted legislation either exempting intellectually disabled criminals
from the death penalty or eliminating the death penalty entirely since the
Penry decision, the Court surmised that modem society now viewed in-
tellectually disabled offenders as "categorically less culpable" than other
criminals.'9 Consequently, the Court concluded that a national consensus
had developed against the execution of intellectually disabled offend-
ers.20
In considering the issue, the Court utilized the AAIDD's definition
of "intellectual disability": subaverage intellectual functioning, signifi-
cant limitations in adaptive skills, and onset prior to the age of eight-
een.21 It listed a number of characteristics often associated with this defi-
7. Id at 308.
8. Id.




13. 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically ban
the execution of intellectually disabled offenders).
14. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 316.
17. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
18. Id. at 318.
19. Id. at 316.
20. See id
21. Id. at 318. Note that the Atkins Court used the term "mental retardation."
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nition, including diminished capacity for processing information, com-
municating, abstracting and learning from mistakes, engaging in logical
reasoning, controlling impulses, and understanding the reactions of oth-
ers.22 The Court stated that such characteristics negated the major pur-
poses underlying imposition of the death penalty-retribution and deter-
rence. 23 The Court reasoned that the national consensus that had devel-
oped likely reflected the judgment that the characteristics accompanying
intellectual disability made intellectually disabled offenders less culpable
and consequently less deserving of retribution.24 Similarly, these same
characteristics made it less likely that intellectually disabled offenders
consider the potential for execution when carrying out crimes, thereby
negating the death penalty's deterrent effect. 25 The Court further opined
that these characteristics might also undermine the procedural safeguards
inherent in capital proceedings because intellectually disabled offenders
may be less able to assist their lawyers, act as good witnesses, or appear
to juries to have remorse for their crimes. 2 6 Consequently, the Court held
that the execution of intellectually disabled offenders violates the Eighth
Amendment.2 7 However, it left open to the states the task of properly
defining the scope of and enforcing this new prohibition.
II. INCONSISTENCIES AMONG THE STATES
Because of the Supreme Court's deference to the states in defining
and implementing the ban on intellectually disabled offenders, different
standards have arisen. These inconsistencies can be divided into four
general categories: the definitional framework, the assessment of the
definitional components, the fact finder and timing for the intellectual
disability determination, and the standard and allocation of the burden of
proof. Variations in each area will be reviewed in turn.
A. Inconsistencies in the Definitional Framework
In general, states have utilized three definitional frameworks in de-
fining "intellectual disability": the AAIDD's definition, the American
Psychological Association's definition, and state-created definitions. The
most common of these definitions, and the one referred to in the Atkins
case, 2 9 is the definition provided by the AAIDD. 30 The AAIDD defines
"intellectual disability" as a "disability characterized by significant limi-
tations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as ex-
22. Id.
23. Id at 319.
24. Id
25. Id.
26. Id. at 316-317.
27. Id. at 316.
28. Id at 317.
29. Id at 318.
30. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 87-89.
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pressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability
originates before age 18."31 This definition can be broken into three dis-
tinct components: (1) the "intellectual functioning" component, (2) the
"adaptive behavior" or "adaptive functioning" component, and (3) the
manifestation during the developmental period (commonly referred to as
"early onset") component.32 According to the AAIDD, the intellectual
functioning component includes characteristics such as learning, reason-
ing, and problem solving. The AAIDD states that an IQ score of two
standard deviations below the mean for the IQ test used is the upper
threshold for meeting the intellectual functioning component. 34 The
adaptive behavior component requires limitations in the following three
skill sets: conceptual, social, and practical skills.35 A score of two stand-
ard deviations below the mean for the adaptive behavioral assessment
used qualifies an individual as having limitations in adaptive function-
ing.3 6 The early onset component requires that the disability originate
before the age of eighteen.37
Other states choose to follow the similar three-pronged definition
from the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The APA's current
definition, included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-
IV), is as follows:
A. Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of approx-
imately 70 or below39 on an individually administered IQ test.
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning
(i.e., the person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for
his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the fol-
lowing areas: communication, self-care, home living, so-
cial/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.
40C. The onset is before age 18 years.
31. Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition, AM.
Ass'N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 1 (Jan. 2008),
http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/AAIDDFAQonlD.pdf [hereinafter AAIDD Definition].
32. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 87, 89.
33. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 2.
34. Id (noting that generally a score two standard deviations below the mean will fall in the
range of a score of 70 to 75 depending on the IQ test used).
35. Id.
36. Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems ofSupport, AM. Ass'N ON
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 20 (2010),
http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/CoreSlide.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual Disability].
37. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31.
38. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 88.
39. The word "approximately" in the definition indicates that a score of 70 is an approxima-
tion of a score that is two standard deviations below the mean for the IQ test being used. Richard J.
Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association's Resource Document on Mental Retardation and




The APA definition also categorizes an individual's level of intellectual
disability based on IQ score into one of the following categories: mild,
moderate, severe, and profound.4 '
Generally, states use either the AAIDD's or the APA's definition of
"intellectual disability" due to the clinical nature of each.42 However,
despite the general similarities between the two definitions, obvious dif-
ferences exist. For example, the APA sets an approximate cutoff score,
whereas the AAIDD allows for a wider variation of scores depending on
the IQ test used. Furthermore, the two definitions differ as to the adaptive
functioning areas in which an individual must have behavioral limita-
tions to be deemed intellectually disabled. Consequently, utilization of
the different definitions results in states measuring the intellectual func-
tioning component and defining the adaptive functioning component in
41divergent manners.
In a wholly separate category are states that adopt their own inde-
pendent definitions of "intellectual disability." Some of these states adopt
terms from the AAIDD or APA definitions and then rely on judicial in-
terpretation to fill in the meanings of those terms." For example, Cali-
fornia defines "intellectual disability" as "significantly subaverage gen-
eral intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adap-
tive behavior and manifested before the age of 18. The lack of further
definition requires judicial interpretation of the meaning of each defini-
tional component. Other states define "intellectual disability" as at or
below a certain IQ score and then shift the burden to the prosecution to
prove the defendant is not intellectually disabled.4 6 For example, Illi-
nois's criminal procedure statute provides for a presumption of intellec-
tual disability when an individual scores 75 or below on an IQ test.4 7
Although the statute also requires concurrent deficits in adaptive behav-
ior, the presumption accompanying the IQ score causes the adaptive be-
havior component to carry far less weight because the presumption au-
tomatically shifts the burden of proof to the other side.
B. Inconsistencies in the Assessment of the Definitional Component
In addition to variations in the definitional framework of the intel-
lectual disability standard, states vary in how they define and assess each
40. ROBERT L. SPITZER ET AL., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS CASEBOOK 366 (4th ed. 1994).
41. Id. at 549.
42. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 92.
43. Id. at 92-93.
44. Brooke Amos, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Analyzing the Correct Standard and Examination
Practices to Use When Determining Mental Retardation, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 469, 482
(2011).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (West 2012).
46. See Amos, supra note 44.
47. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/114-15 (West 2012).
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component of the "intellectual disability" definition. Because the three-
pronged clinical definition is the most popular, 4 8 only variations in as-
sessment of that definition's components will be analyzed. First, states
vary widely in the instrument they use to measure intellectual function-
ing. Second, states vary in how adaptive behavior limitations are as-
sessed, especially due to the varying definitions of this component.
Third, states differ in how they determine whether an individual's intel-
lectual disability originated prior to eighteen years of age.
Although states widely agree that the intellectual functioning com-
ponent should be measured by a standardized IQ test,4 9 the options for
such a test are many. Some of these variations include the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (assessing verbal comprehension, perceptual
reasoning, working memory, and processing speed),50 the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scale (assessing verbal reasoning, quantitative reasoning,
and short-term memory),5 ' the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelli-
gence Test (assessing sequential reasoning, induction, long-term
memory, word knowledge and language development, language compre-
hension, listening ability, visual processing, cultural knowledge, and
delayed memory),52 and the Cognitive Assessment System (assessing
planning, attention, integration of separate stimuli, and the ability to seri-
ally order things). 3 Although each test purports to measure intelligence,
each does so on a different basis. The consequences of this divergence
become apparent when considering that the scientific community gener-
ally agrees that intellectually disabled individuals have limitations that
exist concurrently with their strengths.5 4 Consequently, one test might
highlight an individual's strengths, whereas another test might highlight
that same individual's weaknesses and therefore provide a vastly differ-
ent score. 5 These discrepancies could mean the difference between be-
ing classified as intellectually disabled or not and consequently being
spared or sentenced to death.56
48. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 87, 89.
49. Amos, supra note 44, at 490.
50. John Fabian et al., Life, Death and IQ: It's Much More than Just a Score: Understanding
and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual
Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399,406 (2011).
51. Richard Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge oflImplementing Atkins v. Virgin-
ia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudication of Mental
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 827 (2007).
52. Kaufinan Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test, ENCYCLOPEDIA MENTAL DISORDERS,
http://www.minddisorders.com/Kau-NulKaufman-Adolescent-and-Adult-Intelligence-
Test.html#ixzz29xNOC4bW (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
53. ESTHER STRAUSS ET AL., A COMPENDIUM OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS:
ADMINISTRATION, NORMS, AND COMMENTARY 133 (3d ed. 2006).
54. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31.
55. See Fabian et al., supra note 50, at 414 (explaining that test scores are not expected to be
the same across different tests).
56. See infra Part II.D.
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Variations in assessing the adaptive behavior component are even
greater than those in assessing intellectual functioning due to the adap-
tive behavior component's relatively new addition to the scientific defi-
nition of "intellectual disability."57 Consequently, over 200 different as-
sessments of adaptive behavior currently exist. 8 Typical adaptive behav-
ior assessments involve mental health professionals interviewing or
providing questionnaires to third parties, such as teachers and parents,
who are involved in an intellectually disabled individual's life.59 Some of
these tests depend solely on accounts provided by third parties such as
caregivers, some depend on a wider variety of third-party accounts, and
some incorporate observation of the individual being assessed.6 0 The
existence of these divergent approaches to assessment of the adaptive
behavior component highlights the lack of one uniform and reliable
method and the consequent need to choose an assessment with proven
scientific reliability and validity.6 1
Despite its seemingly clear definition, the early onset component of
intellectual disability is also measured in varied ways. Measurement can
include diagnoses made before the age of eighteen, IQ tests administered
before the age of eighteen, or any variety of evidence indicating the onset
of intellectual disability prior to the age of eighteen. 62 Allowing for vari-
ous forms of evidence to indicate the onset of intellectual disability prior
to eighteen is appropriate because problems can arise when states require
formal diagnoses or test results from before an individual turned eight-
een.63 Such requirements can result in discrimination against persons
whose mental health needs were not appropriately addressed during their
adolescence.64 For example, some intellectually disabled offenders may
not have had adequate access to mental health services as a child, result-
ing in their mental health needs being overlooked.6
C. Inconsistencies in the Identity of the Fact Finder and the Timing of the
Determination
In addition to these definitional variances, states differ as to who de-
termines the existence of intellectual disability and when during the trial
that determination is made. States may select the judge, the jury, or an
expert to make the intellectual disability determination.6 6 The Atkins de-
termination is very similar to criminal competency and criminal insanity
57. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 846.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 847.
60. WILLIAM COOK, DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SERVICES TO PERSONS WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN MONTANA: A STAFF REFERENCE MANUAL 14-16 (5th ed. 2011).
61. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 97.




66. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 85; see also Amos, supra note 44, at 495.
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determinations. Consequently, for purposes of determining the appropri-
ate fact finder, this Comment will treat the role of the fact finder in At-
kins determinations as identical to that in competency and insanity pro-
ceedings.67 When a judge is used as the fact finder, the judge generally
makes a pretrial determination during an Atkins proceeding about wheth-
er the facts presented by the party with the burden satisfy the relevant
legal standard.68 This, in turn, dictates how the ensuing prosecution will
proceed.69 For example, if the judge decides that the defendant is not
intellectually disabled, then the prosecution will pursue a capital trial. On
the other hand, when the jury acts as fact finder, the Atkins determination
generally occurs after the guilt phase of trial. 70 Typically, the determina-
tion will involve some consideration of the individual's culpability in the
charged crime.7 1 Finally, when the court selects and utilizes an expert as
fact finder, the expert can acts as a neutral party wholly separate from the
adversarial process.72 The experts make their determinations based on
their interpretations of facts relevant to diagnosing intellectual disabil-
ity.7 3 The experts then present their opinions via testimony as part of the
defense's mitigation theories.74
D. Inconsistencies in the Allocation of and Standard for the Burden of
Proof
The final area of inconsistency among the states is the allocation of
and standard for the burden of proof at an Atkins hearing. States can allo-
cate the burden of proof on either the defendant or the Government. No
states, however, have chosen to place the burden on the Government. 76
This procedural aspect therefore requires little discussion. On the other
hand, states do vary in the standard they impose for the burden of
proof.7 7 Three categories for this burden exist: (1) preponderance of the
evidence, (2) clear and convincing proof, and (3) beyond a reasonable
doubt.78 Because states consistently allocate the burden to the defendant,
oftentimes the standard alone will ultimately determine whether a de-
67. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 105.
68. Id. at 106. Alternatively, a judge may make the intellectual disability determination during
the sentencing phase of trial. However, if a defendant is determined pre-trial not to be intellectually
disabled, a less involved sentencing phase may be required. Therefore, generally the judge will make
the determination during the pre-trial phase to increase judicial efficiency. See id. at 105-06, 110.
69. Id. at 105.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Amos, supra note 44, at 495.
73. Id.
74. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 857.
75. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 114.
76. Seeid.atll8.
77. Justin Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill ofRights: The Tension Between the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modem Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J.




fendant is found intellectually disabled. 9 A defendant who could be
found intellectually disabled in a state whose burden is preponderance of
the evidence may not be found intellectually disabled in a state whose
burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. This disparity exemplifies the in-
consistency resulting from differing burdens of proof among the states.80
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE A TKiNS STANDARD IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Because of these discrepancies among the states, modern death pen-
alty jurisprudence regarding the prohibition on executing the intellectual-
ly disabled has proven incapable of producing a consistent standard.81
This lack of consistency is exemplified by surveying the Atkins standards
applied in some of the state trial courts comprising the Tenth Circuit. A
comparison of the standards in Oklahoma, Colorado, and Kansas is tell-
ing. In Oklahoma, the relevant standard utilizes the three-pronged clini-
cal definition but adds a requirement that the defendant have an IQ of no
more than 70.82 Colorado also adheres to the three-pronged definition,
and although it does not implement additional requirements as Oklahoma
does, it does not provide any definitional guidance as to each of the three
prongs.83 Conversely, Kansas's utilization of the three-pronged standard
includes precise definitional components and implements a precondi-
tion84 that defendants must meet before they can even attempt to prove
their intellectual disability.85 A detailed comparison of the Atkins stand-
ard in these three states follows. This comparison shows that even among
states adhering to the three-pronged definition, wide variation abounds
regarding the definitions and processes by which these states implement
the Atkins ban.
A. Oklahoma
Application of the Atkins standard in Oklahoma is exemplified in
the recent Tenth Circuit case of Hooks v. Workman,86 in which an Atkins
hearing resulted in a determination that the defendant was not intellectu-
ally disabled.87 In Hooks, the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder and first-degree manslaughter for the beating death of his preg-
79. Id. at 1289.
80. Id. at 1289-90.
81. Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally
Protect the Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529,
578 (2011).
82. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003), overruled on other
grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
83. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101 (2012).
84. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6622 (2012) (requiring the court to determine that there is
"sufficient reason to believe" that the defendant has an intellectual disability prior to allowing an
Atkins proceeding).
85. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01 (2012).
86. 689 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2012).
87. Id. at 1173.
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nant common law wife.8 At the defendant's Atkins hearing, both parties
agreed that the defendant's disabilities had manifested themselves before
the age of eighteen but disagreed as to whether the defendant had limita-
tions in his intellectual and adaptive functioning." At the Atkins hearing,
nine IQ tests taken over a thirty-four-year period were presented to the
jury with scores ranging from 53 to 80.90 The jury also heard evidence
about the defendant's limited functioning in the adaptive skill areas of
communication and academics. 9' Considering the range of IQ scores and
the strengths the defendant had in other areas of adaptive functioning, the
jury concluded that the defendant had not proven his intellectual disabil-
ity by a preponderance of the evidence and his conviction was upheld.92
Thereafter, the defendant filed two habeas petitions, addressing,
among other matters, the shortcomings of the procedure and result of his
Atkins hearing. 93 The defendant claimed that despite the jury's finding,
he had proven with sufficient evidence that he was intellectually disabled
based on his IQ scores and his limitations in two areas of adaptive func-
tioning.94
To resolve the defendant's sufficiency challenge and determine
whether the lower court had reasonably applied Atkins, the Tenth Circuit
began by reciting Oklahoma's Atkins standard as laid out in Murphy v.
State.95 The Murphy court held that a defendant is intellectually disabled
if he or she has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, the in-
tellectual disability manifested prior to the age of eighteen, and the de-
fendant concurrently suffers from significant limitations in adaptive
functioning. 96 The Murphy court provided a list of areas in which the
limitations of the defendant's intellectual functioning must be apparent
and a list of nine skill areas in which limitations in adaptive functioning
could be manifest. These limitations can be proven through IQ tests,
along with other evidence.9 8 The court held that defendants must estab-
lish their intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence dur-
ing trial.99 The court also imposed a precondition that a defendant must
have an IQ of no greater than 70 to even be allowed an Atkins hearing.100
88. Id. at 1161.
89. Id.at1l67.
90. ld at 1168.
91. Seeid.atll71.
92. Seeid.atll71.
93. Id. at 1161-62.
94. Seeid.at 1164.
95. 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Blonner v.








In considering whether the defendant had presented sufficient evi-
dence to meet the intellectual functioning prong of this test, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the lower court's reasoning that the lower IQ scores
reflected Hooks's refusal to cooperate during a period of trauma in his
life rather than limitations in intellectual functioning.'01 The two test
scores that the lower court found reliable included a 72 and a 76.102 The
court held that because these scores fell above the threshold score of 70
required by Murphy, a rational trier of fact could have found that the
defendant was not eligible to be considered intellectually disabled and
that the court had not unreasonably applied Atkins.'0 3
The court then moved on to consider whether the defendant pre-
sented sufficient evidence to meet the significant limitations in the adap-
tive functioning prong.' Contrary to the defendant's argument, and not-
ing that the Supreme Court had left "the precise contours of the defini-
tion" to the states, the court reasoned that it was not necessary to focus
on the defendant's limitations at the exclusion of his strengths.'0o After
listing various evidence regarding Hooks' strengths in many of the adap-
tive functioning skill sets, the court concluded that a rational fact finder
could have found that Hooks did not satisfy this prong of the test.'06 The
court also reasoned that all of the evidence presented by the defendant
regarding his adaptive functioning had come from witness testimony and
therefore should be appraised based on witness credibility.107 It cited the
rational fact finder standard as further reason to deny the defendant's
sufficiency of the evidence challenge and to find that the lower court had
reasonably applied the Atkins standard.'o
B. Colorado
The application of the Atkins standard in Oklahoma can be contrast-
ed with that in Oklahoma's Tenth Circuit sister state of Colorado. The
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Colorado's stat-
ute banning the execution of intellectually disabled defendants in People
v. Vasquez.109 In Vasquez, the defendant, Jimmy Vasquez, was charged
with first-degree murder."o He filed a motion indicating his intent to
establish that he was intellectually disabled, and subsequently asked the
court to find Colorado's Atkins statute unconstitutional because it re-
101. Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1171.
105. Id. at 1171-72.
106. Id. at 1172-73.
107. Id. at 1l73.
108. Id.
109. 84 P.3d 1019, 1020-21 (Colo. 2004).
110. Id. at 1020.
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quired defendants to prove their intellectual disability by clear and con-
vincing evidence."'
The Colorado Supreme Court began its analysis by referencing Col-
orado's statute banning the execution of intellectually disabled individu-
als.'1 2 The statute defines "intellectually disabled defendant" as "any
defendant with significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested and documented during the developmental period."" 3 The
statute also requires that the intellectual disability determination be made
prior to trial and that the defendant have the burden of proving his intel-
lectual disability by clear and convincing evidence."14 Because of the
timing of the determination, the statute designates the court as the fact
finder.' 's Regarding the intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior
evaluations themselves, the statute also requires that if more than one
evaluation is ordered, at least one must be performed by a psychologist
recommended by the executive director of the Department of Human
Services.11 6 The statute allows for evidence of statements made by the
defendant, of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime, and of the defendant's medical and social history to be included in
the evaluation.'17
After its review of the relevant intellectual disability standard, the
court reviewed the Atkins decision and noted that it implemented a sub-
stantive, rather than procedural, rule." 8 The Colorado Supreme Court
then held that both the allocation of the burden and the burden itself were
constitutional because Atkins had left it up to the states to determine how
to implement the ban and nothing in Atkins bars a state from enacting a
process by which to exclude intellectually disabled defendants from capi-
tal punishment." 9
C. Kansas
The Atkins standard implemented in Oklahoma and Colorado con-
trasts sharply with the Atkins standard implemented in Kansas. Accord-
ing to Kansas's relevant statutory scheme, when defendants wish to es-
tablish that they are intellectually disabled, the court must initially de-
termine whether there is sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant
1 11. Id.
112. Id. at 1021.
113. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2012). Note that the statute uses the term "mentally
retarded defendant."
114. Id. § 18-1.3-1102.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 18-1.3-1104.
117. Id.
118. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1022 (Colo. 2004).
119. Id. at l021.
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is intellectually disabled.120 If the court finds evidence for this belief, in
order to make its final determination, the court must appoint two profes-
sionals to perform an evaluation on the defendant: either two psycholo-
gists, two physicians, or one of each.12 1 The professionals must be "quail-
fled by training and practice" in order to be appointed by the court. 2 2
The Kansas statutory scheme defines "intellectual disability" as
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing con-
currently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
period from birth to age 18.",123 The statute requires that the defendant
have significant subaverage general intellectual functioning "to an extent
which substantially impairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality
of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of
law." 2 4 For defendants to fulfill the subaverage intellectual functioning
prong of the test, they must score at least two standard deviations below
the mean score on a standardized test that is specified by the secretary of
social and rehabilitation services.12 5 The statute also provides a definition
of "adaptive behavior": "the effectiveness or degree with which an indi-
vidual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsi-
bility expected of that person's age, cultural group and community." 2 6
At the Atkins hearing, defendants may present any evidence they wish to
convince the judge that they are intellectually disabled.12 7
D. Comparison of the Tenth Circuit States
To further highlight the inconsistent ways in which the Atkins
standard is applied among the states, Table I below presents a side-by-
side comparison of the three Tenth Circuit states just discussed. For each
state, the table compares the definitional framework, the assessment of
the definitional components, the fact finder and timing for the determina-
tion, the allocation of and standard for the burden of proof, and types of
evidence allowed in an Atkins hearing. The comparison presented by the
table highlights the obvious lack of a consistent Atkins standard.
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6622 (2012).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01 (2012).
124. Id. § 21-6622.
125. Id. § 76-12b01.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 21-6622.
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12b01 (2012); Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM INCONSISTENT ATKINS
STANDARDS
The inconsistencies among states in the application of the Atkins
standard lend themselves to a number of constitutional issues. These
issues stem from the fact that the Supreme Court left it to state discretion
to decide how to define and implement the Atkins ban. This decision, and
the consequent varying standards that states have promulgated since, lead
to violations in two areas of the Constitution: the Eighth Amendment and
the incorporation doctrine.
A. Eighth Amendment Issues
Ironically, although Atkins was intended to remedy violations of the
Eighth Amendment in light of "evolving standards of decency,"l 28 the
fact that the Court deferred to the states the decision about how to im-
plement the new ban has resulted in a different violation of the Eighth
Amendment: arbitrariness. In Furman v. Georgia,129 the Supreme Court
held in a plurality opinion that an arbitrarily applied punishment falls
into the category of "cruel and unusual punishment." 30 Justice Douglas,
in concurrence, reasoned that the Eighth Amendment's predecessor in
the English Bill of Rights was aimed at preventing "selective or irregular
128. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
129. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
130. Id. at 239-40.
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application of harsh penalties."' 3 He noted that this now contemporary
recognition of "the basic theme of equal protection" implicit in the
Eighth Amendment is violated when a punishment is applied arbitrarily
or discriminatorily.13 2 As aptly stated by Justice Stewart, "where the ul-
timate punishment of death is at issue[,] a system of standardless jury
discretion violates the Eighth ... Amendment[]."
The Supreme Court left the Atkins decision vulnerable to arbitrary
application in violation of the Eighth Amendment by deferring the defi-
nition and implementation processes to the states. By not providing a
precise definition, process, or designated fact finder, the Court provided
for an increased likelihood of arbitrary results.134 When juries without
backgrounds in psychology or health care are allowed to determine
whether a defendant is intellectually disabled, it is far more likely that
extrinsic, individualized factors will weigh in their decisions, causing the
decisions to be highly subjective and potentially baseless.'35 To be sure,
these dangers are present in all capital murder cases; however, the dan-
gers are especially apparent in Atkins hearings due to the clinical under-
pinnings of the Atkins standard. 3 6
B. Doctrine ofIncorporation Issues
The other constitutional issue brought about by the inconsistencies
in the implementation of the Atkins standard involves violations of the
doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine of incorporation refers to the pro-
cess by which the fundamental rights provided in the Bill of Rights are
applied to the individual states.' 37 The doctrine places particular im-
portance on the uniform application of the Bill of Rights across the sev-
eral states, specifically prohibiting the states from applying "watered-
down" versions of the rights.'3 ' This leaves almost no room for deference
to the states when it comes to defining the incorporated rights.' 39
In Robinson v. Cahfornia,14 0 the Supreme Court noted that the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment was applica-
ble to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.141 According to the doctrine of incorporation, therefore, the
Eighth Amendment must be applied "consistently and with equal force"
131. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 249.
133. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n. 47 (1976).
134. Amos, supra note 44, at 484.
135. Id. at 485.
136. See id. at 493.
137. Marceau, supra note 77, at 1242.
138. Id. at 1242-43 (quoting Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 24 (1964) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
139. Id.
140. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
141. Id. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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across the several states. 142 However, even a quick glance at the Tenth
Circuit summary table shows that the Atkins ban has certainly not been
applied in any consistent manner. 14 3 States vary in how they define, as-
sess, and procedurally implement the ban. Such disparity directly vio-
lates the doctrine of incorporation.144
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR A CONSISTENT STANDARD
Constitutional concerns such as these justify the need for a con-
sistent Atkins standard among the states. To comport with the mandates
of the doctrine of incorporation, and to avoid further violation of the
Eighth Amendment, there must be at least a minimum baseline level of
consistency in the Atkins standard.14 5 The most appropriate standard is
one that takes account of three important considerations: the general
guidelines provided by the Supreme Court in Atkins, current scientific
research regarding the definition and diagnosis of intellectual disabil-
ity,146 and the mandates of the Constitution.14 7 Implementation of the
consistent standard recommended by this Comment will remedy the not-
ed constitutional violations because those violations derive from the in-
consistent application of the standard itself. Focusing on the remaining
two considerations, the guidance of the Atkins court and the principles of
science, will supply the needed consistent standard.
This Comment recommends the following: when implementing the
Atkins ban, courts should adhere to the AAIDD definition of "intellectual
disability" for both their definitional frameworks and for the definitions
of the components of that framework. In regard to assessing the compo-
nents of this definition, the intellectual functioning component should be
assessed by either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) or the
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Stanford-Binet), the adaptive func-
tioning component should be assessed by Scales of Independent Behav-
ior (SIB-R), AAIDD Adaptive Behavior Scale (ABAS-II), or Inventory
for Client and Agency Planning (ICAP), and the early onset component
should be a holistic assessment. It is further recommended that procedur-
ally the judge should make the intellectual disability determination prior
to trial and defendants should bear the burden of proving intellectual
disability by a preponderance of the evidence. Adherence to this standard
142. Marceau, supra note 77, at 1242.
143. See supra Part fIl.D.
144. Marceau, supra note 77, at 1292 ("These divergent standards as to a federal constitutional
right are in tension with the general dictates of federal supremacy and the specific mandates of
constitutional incorporation. There is simply no federal oversight, much less uniformity.").
145. See id. at 1302.
146. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
147. Use of a consistent standard in and of itself will ensure that the third consideration is met.
Therefore, in justifying this Comment's various recommendations, only the other two considerations
will be explicitly addressed.
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will remedy the problems created by the current lack of a consistent
standard. 148
A. Recommended Definitional Framework: The AAIDD Definition
The AAIDD's definition of "intellectual disability" should be used
consistently at all Atkins hearings. The Atkins decision supports the use
of this definition. Although the Supreme Court in Atkins did not mandate
a definition for use by the states, it did provide some general guide-
lines. 149 According to the Court, "clinical definitions of [intellectual dis-
ability] require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also
significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-
care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18."lso In
providing this definitional framework, the Court referenced two separate
definitions-those of the AAIDD and the APA.15 ' Although these two
definitions are nearly the same in substance, the goals underlying each
are different. The goal of the APA is to promote education, research, and
patient care in the field of psychiatry.152 The AAIDD's stated mission, on
the other hand, is to "promote[] progressive policies, sound research,
effective practices, and universal human rights for people with intellectu-
al and developmental disabilities."1 5 3 As a matter of policy and for the
sake of consistency, the AAIDD's definition should be used because it
incorporates evolving policy, research, practice, and human rights of the
intellectually disabled, rather than the more general concern with the
field of psychiatry found in the APA's definition. The underlying poli-
cies of the AAIDD also contribute to the alignment of the AAIDD defini-
tion with the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Atkins and with
the ever-evolving scientific standards behind intellectual disability. Con-
sequently, this Comment recommends that the appropriate definitional
framework for use in an Atkins hearing is as follows: (1) significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in adaptive
behavior, and (3) onset or origination before the age of eighteen.154
In keeping with the need for consistency, each component of the
definitional framework should align with the well-developed correspond-
ing AAIDD definition of the component. Accordingly, "subaverage intel-
lectual functioning" should be defined as limitations in one's "general
mental capability that include[] the ability to reason, solve problems,
think abstractly, plan, and learn from experience, [and] comprehend[]
148. See Entzeroth, supra note 81, at 578.
149. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 308 n.3.
152. About APA & Psychiatry, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, http://www.psychiatry.org/about-
apa-psychiatry (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
153. Mission, AM. Ass'N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
http://www.aamr.org/content 443.cfin?navlD-129 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
154. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 5-6.
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one's surroundings." 5 5 Subaverage intellectual functioning is reflected
by a score at least two standard deviations below the mean score on the
IQ test being used, taking into account the standard error of measurement
for the test as well.'56 "Adaptive behavior" should be defined as perfor-
mance in three categories of skill sets: conceptual skills,'5 7 social
skills,' 58 and practical skills.'5 9 Like subaverage intellectual functioning,
limitations in adaptive behavior are also reflected by a score at least two
standard deviations below the mean score on the behavioral assessment
being used, taking into account the standard error of measurement for the
assessment.160 The AAIDD's definitions for these individual components
align with the guidance provided by the Atkins Court and are based on
the most up-to-date clinical science.
B. Recommended Assessment of the Definitional Components
Because the AAIDD provides a clinical definition of "intellectual
disability," it is most appropriate to assess each component according to
modem clinical research and standards.' 6' This ensures utilization of the
most modem science. It is important, however, to also align these clinical
principles with the policy considerations behind the prohibition on exe-
cuting the intellectually disabled, as noted by the Atkins Court.
1. Recommended Assessment of the Subaverage "Intellectual
Functioning" Component
Choosing an assessment standard is complicated due to the various
available options for IQ tests.16 2 In deciding the appropriate test, one
must seek to maintain consistency without mandating one single test
because no test is one-size-fits-all. 63 In its manual, the AAIDD does
provide some guidance as to what type of test is most appropriate by
stating that "[u]ntil more robust instruments based upon one or more of
the multifactorial theories of intellectual functioning are developed and
demonstrated to be psychometrically sound, we will continue to rely on a
155. Amos, supra note 44, at 474 (quoting AM. Ass'N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 55 (10th ed. 2002))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
156. Intellectual Disability, supra note 36, at 8.
157. Conceptual skills include language and literacy; money, time, and number concepts; and
self-direction. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 2.
158. Social skills include interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility,
naivet6 (i.e., wariness), social problem solving, and the ability to follow rules or obey laws and to
avoid being victimized. Id.
159. Practical skills include activities of daily living (personal care), occupational skills,
healthcare, travel or transportation, schedules or routines, safety, use of money, and use of the tele-
phone. Id
160. Intellectual Disability, supra note 36.
161. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 815-16.
162. See supra Part I.B.
163. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 827-28.
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global (general factor) IQ as a measure of intellectual functioning."'6
Additionally, these tests should be generally accepted by the scientific
community and utilize the most up-to-date diagnostic procedures.1 6 5
Choosing tests that fit these standards will therefore satisfy the consid-
eration of utilizing up-to-date scientific research and methods.
At the outset, it should be noted that due to the inclusion of defend-
ants with mild intellectual disability in the Atkins prohibition,'66 the IQ
test used must adequately include these individuals within the intellectual
disability definition to comport with the guidance provided by the Atkins
Court. Although there are many tests available, this Comment recom-
mends that subaverage intellectual functioning be assessed using either
the WAIS or the Stanford-Binet intelligence quotient test.
The WAIS is considered exceptionally reliable, valid, organized,
and easy to use.167 It measures vocabulary, arithmetic, and visual-spatial
skills on both a verbal and performance basis.168 Likewise, the Stanford-
Binet is highly representative of the general population and is considered
highly reliable overall.169 It measures five different categories: fluid rea-
soning (the ability for complex problem solving), knowledge, quantita-
tive reasoning (the ability to complete mathematical word problems),
visual-spatial processing (interpretation of figures and diagrams), and
working memory (short-term memory).17 0 The test assesses these factors
both verbally and non-verbally.171 Both IQ tests, when used in their full
form as they should be, utilize various subtests to create a composite IQ
score based on a range of intellectual functioning components.172 This
comports with the guidance provided by the AAIDD. Furthermore, both
of these tests are normed on the general population, thereby including
individuals with intellectual capacities ranging from severely intellectu-
ally disabled to genius level.173 Consequently, they sufficiently account
for the Atkins Court's mandate that the definition of "intellectual disabil-
ity" include those individuals with only mild intellectual disability who
may not be accounted for in tests focusing only on more obviously intel-
lectually disabled individuals.
164. AAIDD AD Hoc COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 41 (1 Ith ed. 2010).
165. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 829-30.
166. Id. at 822.
167. Alexis K. Dowling, Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's
Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 799 (2003).
168. Id. at 798 n.230.
169. Id at 800.
170. Tips to Encounter a Stanford Binet IQ Test, PERSONALITY-AND-APTITUDE-CAREER-
TESTS.COM, http://www.personality-and-aptitude-career-tests.com/stanford-binet-iq-test.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2013).
171. Id
172. See id
173. Dowling, supra note 167, at 799 800.
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To promote consistency and ensure that tests are not chosen arbi-
trarily, Virginia's model for available choices of IQ test should be uti-
lized by all states. Virginia's statutory scheme "requires the Comiis-
sioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Ser-
vices [to] maintain an 'exclusive list' of appropriate tests for use in
courts during Atkins hearings. 7 4 An analogous official in each state
should be appointed or required to carry out this same responsibility.
Initially, only the WAIS and Stanford-Binet should be included in such a
list of tests. However, formalized procedures should be provided for any
litigant wishing to add additional tests to this list. 17 5 Although the exact
contours of such a procedure are beyond the scope of this Comment, the
procedure should serve the dual purpose of providing a screening mech-
anism that would help ensure that only the highest quality tests are al-
lowed into the courtroom and allowing the list to be updated as newer
and more scientifically sound tests are produced. 176
2. Recommended Assessment of the Limitations in "Adaptive
Functioning" Component
Limitations in adaptive functioning should be assessed with one of
the three following tests: the SIB-R, the ABAS-II, or the ICAP. As with
IQ tests, an exclusive list of appropriate tests should be maintained by a
designated authority, along with a formalized procedure for the addition
of new tests to ensure that up-to-date science is being utilized.
The SIB-R, ABAS-II, and ICAP are the three most commonly used
adaptive behavior assessments for adults. 7 7 The S1B-R is a comprehen-
sive assessment that provides a score based on a combination of an indi-
vidual's adaptive and maladaptive behaviors.178 It measures these behav-
iors in the categories of motor skills, social interaction and communica-
tion skills, personal living skills, and community living skills."' The
SIB-R can be administered either as a questionnaire or as a structured
interview.'so Developed by the AAIDD, the ABAS-II is used to assess
how individuals cope with the demands of their natural and social envi-
ronments.18' The test can be administered in a school or in a community
setting.182 The ICAP is an assessment tool that, like the SIB-R, measures
174. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 832 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1
(2012)).
175. See id at 832-33.
176. See id. at 833.
177. Brad Hill, Adaptive and Maladaptive Behavior Scales, ASSESSMENT PSYCH. ONLINE,
http://www.assessmentpsychology.com/adaptivebehavior.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 2012).
178. Id.
179. Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised, NELSON EDUC.,
http://www.assess.nelson.com/test-ind/sib-r.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
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an individual's adaptive and maladaptive behaviors.183 It also takes into
account an individual's demographics, diagnoses, support services, and
leisure activities.184 Each of these tests comport with the AAIDD's rec-
ommendation that adaptive behavior be assessed "through the use of
standardized test measures normed on the general population, including
people with disabilities and people without disabilities.""' However,
each of these tests also has drawbacks: the SIB-R does not incorporate
observation of the individual being assessed, the ABAS-II is somewhat
confusing and "unidimensional" because it only measures one dimension
of behavior, and the ICAP is limited in scope due to its short length. 18 6
However, the adaptive behavior component is a relatively new addi-
tion to the intellectual disability definition.187 Consequently, new and
improved adaptive behavior assessments are on the horizon. For exam-
ple, in 2013 the AAIDD will release the Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior
Scale, which will directly assess the skill sets included in the AAIDD's
definition of "adaptive behavior."' 88 This makes the recommendation for
a formalized procedure for adding new tests especially important for
adaptive behavior assessments. Some of the standards that should be
included in this procedure include tests that consider each adaptive be-
havior skill set in the context of the individual's peer group, social envi-
ronment, and cultural environment.18' In addition, assessments must in-
clude third-party input from individuals who have regular, substantial
contact with the defendant. 190 This procedure will ensure that the most
modern and scientifically sound assessments are utilized to measure
adaptive behavior for an Atkins hearing.
3. Recommended Assessment of the "Early Onset" Component
The onset of intellectual disability prior to the age of eighteen
should be a holistic assessment. This means that as much information as
possible should be gathered about the defendant's past adaptive behav-
iors and intellectual functioning. 19 This information can be gathered
from an individual's past test scores, medical records, school records,
juvenile court records, etc.' 9 2 There is a general consensus among mental
health organizations that intellectual disability need not be formally di-
agnosed before the age of eighteen, but rather that there be evidence
183. Id
184. Id
185. Bridget M. Doane & Karen L. Salekin, Susceptibility of Current Adaptive Behavior
Measures to Feigned Deficits, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 331 (2009).
186. See Hill, supra note 177.
187. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 846.
188. Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale, AM. ASS'N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, http://www.aaidd.org/contentI 06.cfm?navlD-23 (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
189. Id.
190. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 847.
191. Fabian et al., supra note 50, at 410.
192. Id at 408.
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from sources such as these that it originated prior to that age.'93 Allowing
for a variety of evidence is important because many defendants will not
have a formal diagnosis of intellectual disability that occurred prior to
the age of eighteen' 94 and the mental health needs of many of these indi-
viduals are not properly met during their adolescence.19 5 By allowing
various forms of evidence to show early onset of intellectual disability,
this recommendation will ensure that the Atkins ban is properly applied
to individuals suffering from intellectual disability since adolescence, as
the Atkins Court intended, regardless of the presence of a prior formal
diagnosis.
4. Policy Considerations in the Assessment of Intellectual Disabil-
ity
In addition to aligning with the guidance provided by the Atkins
Court and keeping pace with current scientific standards, the above rec-
ommended definitions and assessments comport with the policy consid-
erations noted by the Atkins Court when mandating the prohibition. In
Atkins, the Supreme Court based part of its reasoning for the ban on the
idea that the characteristics underlying the clinical definition of "intellec-
tual disability" negate the purposes behind the death penalty: deterrence
and retribution. 19 6 The Court explained that the goal of deterrence is only
served in situations in which the crime at issue is the product of premedi-
tation and deliberation.'97 However, the cognitive and behavioral im-
pairments associated with IQ test scores two standards deviations below
the mean, as the AAIDD and this Comment recommend, negate the goal
of deterrence.'9 8 For example, significant limitations in planning and the
ability to think abstractly severely limit one's ability to premeditate com-
plex crimes like homicide and to therefore be deterred by a potential
death penalty sentence.1 99
Regarding retribution, the Atkins Court stated that the purposes of
the death penalty are only served when the offender is highly culpable.200
Philosophers such as Aristotle have long indicated a number of charac-
teristics that a moral agent (i.e., a person who can be morally culpable)
possesses.2 0 ' Some such characteristics include the ability to care for
others, be self-reflective, formulate plans of action, and exercise self-
193. Id. at 407.
194. Id.
195. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 855.
196. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). Note that the Atkins Court used the term
"mental retardation."
197. Id.
198. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 83-84.
199. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
200. Id. at 319-20.
201. Peggy Sasso, Implementing the Death Penalty: The Moral Implications ofRecent Advanc-
es in Neuropsychology, 29 CARDOzO L. REv. 765, 774-76 (2007).
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control.202 The skill sets listed in the adaptive functioning component of
the AAIDD definition address these characteristics. 20 3 Significant limita-
tions in self-reflection and the ability to care for others restrict individu-
als' capacity for moral culpability and cognizance of their "deserving of
execution."204
C. Recommended Procedural Components for Implementing the Atkins
Standard
In addition to having one standardized framework for definition and
assessment, the procedures for implementing the Atkins ban must be con-
sistent. As reflected by the comparison of three Tenth Circuit states, dif-
fering procedural processes may be the sole determination of whether a
defendant is found to be intellectually disabled.205 The first two suggest-
ed procedural aspects are interconnected; they are the timing of the de-
termination and the fact finder. In this regard, a judge, prior to the guilt
phase of trial, should make the Atkins determination. Furthermore, de-
fendants should carry the burden of proving their intellectual disability
by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, this Comment recommends
that proper utilization of expert testimony by the defendant will further
assist in accurate and consistent determinations of whether a defendant is
found to be intellectually disabled.
1. Recommended Fact Finder and Timing for the Determination:
The Judge, and Prior to the Guilt Phase of Trial
The Atkins determination should be made by a judge, prior to the
guilt phase of trial. Because the Atkins Court provided no guidance on
these procedural aspects of the ban, general policy considerations in im-
plementing the ban will be examined for the justification of each recom-
mendation. Preliminarily, and contrary to the views of some legal schol-
ars, using the jury as the fact finder is not required in Atkins hearings.206
The Atkins Court mentioned no such requirement, and prior Supreme
Court precedent only requires that juries make determinations of fact in
situations in which there is a potential for a defendant's punishment to be
increased beyond the statutory maximum. 20 7 The purpose of an Atkins
determination is to determine whether the defendant can be removed
from the purview of the death penalty, thereby potentially decreasing the
punishment rather than increasing it.20 8 Therefore, using the judge as the
fact finder is not only allowable, it is preferable for the following rea-
sons.
202. Id. at 775-76.
203. AAIDD Definition, supra note 31, at 2-3.
204. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
205. See supra Part IID.
206. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 107.
207. Id. at 106-07.
208. Id. at 107.
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As previously mentioned, when the judge is used as the fact finder,
the relevant determination is made prior to trial based on a legal standard
of intellectual disability. 209 A requirement that the determination occur in
this manner is a vital aspect of protecting the Atkins ban.2 10 It is far more
difficult for defendants to make an adequate showing of intellectual disa-
bility after the prosecution has presented all of its evidence, especially if
the crime committed was a heinous one. 2 1 ' This difficulty is heightened
when the jury is the fact finder because jurors might confuse the trial
phase and sentencing phase as being interrelated or improperly consider
* 212the details of the defendant's crime in their determinations. By using
judges, who are more familiar with making objective determinations
based on complicated legal standards (such as the clinical definition of
"intellectual disability"), such risks of inaccuracy and bias are signifi-
cantly reduced.2 13 Of course, judges are humans too and still may be sus-
ceptible to some of these same biases. Therefore, having the determina-
tion occur before the guilt phase of trial will help to further insulate the
judge's decision from improper influences (e.g., knowing the gruesome
details of the crime), thereby decreasing the arbitrariness of Atkins de-
terminations. Furthermore, holding the Atkins determination first will, at
least in some cases, prevent the need for costly and unnecessary capital
d*214proceedings.
2. Recommended Allocation of and Standard for the Burden of
Proof: On the Defendant, and by a Preponderance of the Evi-
dence
For comprehensive procedural consistency in Atkins determinations,
defendants should bear the burden of proving their intellectual disability
by a preponderance of the evidence. The allocation of and standard for
the burden of proof, like the fact finder and timing issues, are best justi-
fied with reference to general policy considerations due to the lack of
guidance from the Atkins Court.
The proper allocation of and standard for the burden of proof are
best determined with reference to two landmark Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding mental competency hearings: Medina v. California215 and
Cooper v. Oklahoma,2 16 respectively. In Medina, the Court held that
placing the burden of proof on a defendant in a criminal competency
209. See supra Part II.C.
210. See Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 109-10.




215. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
216. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
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proceeding did not violate any principles of fundamental fairness.2 17 The
Court reasoned that access to the proceeding in the first place allowed the
defendant "a reasonable opportunity" to prove incompetence.2 18 In that
case, the Court upheld the placement of the burden on the defendant to
prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.2 19 In
Cooper, on the other hand, the Court held that requiring a defendant to
prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence did violate
principles of fundamental fairness.220 This was so, the Court reasoned,
because it meant that even if defendants could prove that they were more
likely than not incompetent, they still might not satisfy the clear and
convincing evidentiary burden.2 2 1 The significant risk of this occurring
222could pose dire consequences for defendants.
Considering that the Supreme Court and a majority of states have
accepted the preponderance of the evidence standard, this is the most
appropriate standard for use in proving a defendant's intellectual disabil-
ity. 22 3 Contrary to the clear and convincing standard, which the Supreme
Court critiques, the preponderance of the evidence standard allows de-
fendants a reasonable opportunity to prove their intellectual disability
and lessens the risk of an excessively high burden, which would allow
the execution of defendants who would otherwise fall within the Atkins
ban. Therefore, the standard of proof for an Atkins determination should
be a preponderance of the evidence. Because it is permissible to place the
burden on the defendant and defendants are in the best position to prove
their own mental health, the burden of proof should be allocated to the
defendant.224
3. Other Recommendations to Ensure Constitutionality
One last related issue that has received scant attention is how evi-
dence of intellectual disability should be presented. All evidence present-
ed at an Atkins hearing should be presented through a uniquely qualified
expert to ensure that an Atkins hearing comports with the most up-to-date
scientific research and standards. This recommendation also aligns with
the Atkins Court's utilization of a clinical definition.225 There has been
some argument that not only should the evidence be presented via an
expert, but that the same expert should also act as the fact finder and
make the final decision as to whether a defendant is intellectually disa-
217. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448-49 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Id. at 451.
219. Id. at 453.
220. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363-64.
221. Id at 364.
222. Id at 363-64.
223. Tobolowsky, supra note 5, at 118.
224. See id. at 117-18.
225. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
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bled.226 However, it is common knowledge that "[t]he law is the ultimate
arbiter of criminal responsibility."2 27 The criminal trial process decides
the moral guilt or innocence of an individual and imposes sanctions
based on that individual's culpability.228 An individual may not receive
these sanctions unless he or she is morally culpable, and this determina-
tion hinges on whether a person is deemed intellectually disabled under
the law. 2 29 Consequently, an appropriate legal fact finder-a judge, as
advocated in this Comment-needs to make the intellectual disability
determination based on sound scientific evidence provided by an appro-
priate expert.
To ensure the accuracy of information brought forth during the At-
kins hearing and to protect against arbitrariness, a consistent set of guide-
lines must be in place for choosing an expert to present testimony on a
defendant's intellectual disability. Virginia's statute provides a model for
what should be required of an expert: (1) the expert should be either a
psychologist or a psychiatrist; (2) the expert should have training and
experiencing in assessing, scoring, and interpreting intelligence and
adaptive behavior measures; and (3) the expert should be trained and
experienced in the performance of forensic evaluations. 2 30 The Supreme
Court has previously noted that "the determination of 'whether a person
is mentally ill turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpret-
ed by expert psychiatrists and psychologists."' 23 1 However, as noted pre-
viously, the ultimate decision must lay with the fact finder-the judge.
These suggested standards simply help judges determine whether an ex-
pert is qualified to provide information relevant to an intellectual disabil-
ity determination. Qualified experts, in turn, support the provision of
reliable and consistent information during Atkins proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Atkins brought forth an important change in Eighth Amendment j u-
risprudence. The prohibition on the execution of the intellectually disa-
bled was a pivotal step in protecting less culpable offenders from exces-
sive punishment. This important protection, however, has been diluted
through its inconsistent application among the several states. A compari-
son of only three states within the Tenth Circuit demonstrates such in-
consistencies. States vary in how they define, assess, and procedurally
implement the ban on executing the intellectually disabled. These incon-
sistencies pose serious threats to the constitutional rights of intellectually
disabled capital defendants.
226. See Amos, supra note 44, passim.
227. Sasso, supra note 201, at 806.
228. Id. at 807.
229. Id. at 808.
230. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 51, at 856.
231. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 449
(1979)).
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To resolve such threats, it is important that there be a level of con-
sistency in the application of the ban. This Comment recommends that
such consistency be realized through the utilization of the AAIDD's def-
initional framework because the AAIDD is referenced by the Atkins
Court and is the leading authority on intellectual disability. It is further
recommended that the AAIDD definitions of each component of that
framework be adopted. Next, utilizing tools consistent with the most up-
to-date scientific research and methods to assess each component of the
AAIDD definition will help to ensure consistent application of the defini-
tional framework. For IQ tests, either the WAIS or Stanford-Binet
should be used as the method of assessment. For adaptive behavior as-
sessments, the SIB-R, ABAS, or ICAP should be utilized until more ad-
vanced tests become available.
To avoid further arbitrariness, this definitional framework and as-
sessment must be consistent in its procedural application. The most ap-
propriate fact finder for an intellectual disability determination is a judge,
who is less likely to be improperly swayed than is a layperson jury. To
further insulate the judge from improper outside influences, the Atkins
determination should be made prior to trial, before any gruesome details
of the crime have been brought forth. Relatedly, judges must base their
decisions on information provided by an appropriate and qualified ex-
pert, thereby ensuring the reliability of judicial determinations as well as
procedural consistency. Lastly, the burden and standard of proof demand
procedural consistency. Placing a preponderance of evidence burden on
the defendant comports with precedent and historical practice while still
allowing defendants a reasonable opportunity to prove their intellectual
disability. Requiring the states to implement these policies will ensure
that the ban on execution of the intellectually disabled is not implement-
ed arbitrarily, thereby protecting the rights of intellectually disabled capi-
tal defendants just as the Supreme Court intended in Atkins v. Virginia.
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